The Goldilocks Rule: Panel Rejects Proposed Insurer-Specific MDL Proceedings for Four Large Insurers, but Establishes MDL Proceeding for the Smallest
November 16, 2020 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Konrad R. Krebs - White and WilliamsIt is an outcome few people expected. Back in August, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Panel) refused plaintiffs’ requests to set up a single industry-wide multi-district litigation, which would have consolidated — in a single massive proceeding — all federal lawsuits seeking COVID-related business interruption coverage from insurers. The Panel acknowledged common legal issues, and potential benefits of coordinated management, but it balanced those benefits against the numerous factual differences between policies, carriers, and insureds, and noted that “[t]hese differences will overwhelm any common factual questions.”
Then, after lengthy argument, the Panel ordered further briefing as to whether separate, company-specific MDL proceedings might be appropriate against five specific insurance carriers: specifically, the five carriers against whom the largest numbers of federal claims were pending.
By choosing these five carriers and not others for further argument, the Panel seemed to be suggesting a formula: the larger the carrier, and the greater the number of claims against it, the greater the potential benefit from coordinated management, and the stronger the plaintiffs’ case for pre-trial consolidation.
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Eric Hermanson, White and WilliamsMr. Hermanson may be contacted at
hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Arkansas Federal Court Fans the Product Liability Flames Utilizing the Malfunction Theory
September 14, 2020 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistTo establish a product liability claim in Arkansas, the plaintiff must prove that the product was supplied in a defective condition, which rendered it unreasonably dangerous and that the defective condition was the proximate cause of the claimed damage or injury. Ordinarily, a plaintiff relies upon direct evidence of a product defect to establish its product liability claim. However, in some cases, the product sustains so much damage that it is impossible for a plaintiff to obtain direct evidence of a defect.
The malfunction theory allows a plaintiff in a product liability action to establish a defect through circumstantial evidence, when direct evidence of a defect no longer exists. In order to utilize the malfunction theory, a plaintiff must present evidence that an unspecified product defect was the most likely cause of the damage/accident and rule out all other possible causes of the damage/accident. In Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Broan-Nutone, No. 5:18-CV-5250, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117116, the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas ruled that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence under “the malfunction theory” to defeat a summary judgment motion in a product liability action involving a bathroom fan that was destroyed in a fire.
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Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Powering Goal Congruence in Construction Through Smart Contracts
February 22, 2021 —
Michael Matthews - Construction ExecutiveThe $814 billion U.S. commercial construction market requires a unique assembly of designers, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers to work together in a highly orchestrated manner to make sure that the right labor, material, equipment, tools and information all comes together at the right place and time. Alignment and coordination between companies is critical for a project to be successful; completed safely, on time, on budget and resulting in an asset that performs as designed.
Yet the industry is slowed by an operating model bogged down by transactional and informational barriers that destroys value across the construction supply chain. Companies are connected through contracts and purchase orders that are undercut by mistrust that yields adversarial relationships and conflicting priorities that result in restricted transparency, elongated payment cycles and an abundance of resource-sucking reconciliations, audits and disputes.
With margins already razor thin, company protectionism cascades down from owners, developers and operators to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers with each player focused on optimizing their piece at the expense of the whole. Perhaps this is part of the reason 98% of megaprojects experience cost overruns or delays, 95% of projects are unable to meet even one business objective; and 70% of all construction projects are not completed within 10% of the proposed budget.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael Matthews, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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First-Party Statutory Bad Faith – 60 Days to Cure Means 60 Days to Cure
October 19, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a first party bad-faith lawsuit, such as a bad faith claim against an insured’s property insurer, there are three requirements that must be met before the bad faith lawsuit is filed: “‘(1) determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; (2) determination of the extent of the insured’s damages; and (3) the required notice must be filed under section 624.155(3)(a).’” Fortune v. First Protective Ins. Co., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2092a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citation omitted).
The third requirement is for the insured to file a Civil Remedy Notice (known as a “CRN”) as a condition precedent to filing a statutory bad faith lawsuit giving the insurer 60 days’ notice of the bad faith violation and to cure the violation, i.e., pay the claim if the violation is payment.
A very common bad faith payment violation is the assertion that the insurer did NOT attempt “in good faith to settle claims when, under the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly towards its insured and with due regard for his or her interests.” Fla. Stat. s. 624.155(1)(b)(1).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Hybrid Contracts for The Sale of Goods and Services and the Predominant Factor Test
February 15, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesFlorida’s Uniform Commercial Code (also known as the UCC) applies to transactions for goods. “Goods” is defined by Article II of the UCC as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 678) and things in action.” Fla. Stat. s. 672.105(1).
The UCC does NOT apply to transactions for services. Transactions for services are governed by common law.
Oftentimes, transactions or contracts include BOTH goods and services. In this scenario, referred to as a hybrid contract, does the UCC or common law apply? In this scenario, courts apply the predominant factor test to determine whether the UCC or common law governs the transaction:
Whether the UCC or the common law applies to a particular hybrid contract depends on “whether the[ ] predominant factor, the [ ] thrust, the[ ] purpose [of the contract], reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom).” In such instances, the determination whether the “predominant factor” in the contract is for goods or for services is a factual inquiry unless the court can determine that the contract is exclusively for goods or services as a matter of law.
Allied Shelving & Equipment, Inc. v. National Deli, LLC, 154 So.3d 482, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
"Ongoing Storm" Rules for the Northeast (Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York & Rhode Island)
February 22, 2021 —
Angeline Ioannou, Kenneth Walton, Colin Hackett, Gregory Katz & Lauren Motola-Davis - Lewis BrisboisThe winter storm that recently brought several feet of snow to the Northeast signaled that we are, indeed, in the middle of winter. Moreover, our nation’s favorite groundhog, Punxsutawney Phil, saw his shadow on Groundhog Day this year, indicating that winter will be with us for six more weeks. As we move through the remainder of this snowy season, it is important for businesses to understand their legal obligations concerning snow removal and the defenses that are available to them in the event that an injury occurs on their premises. This alert summarizes the ongoing storm rules in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, and analyzes property owners’ snow removal responsibilities as well as related premises liability issues under these states’ laws.
Connecticut
It is well settled in Connecticut that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, in fulfilling their duty to invitees on their property, property owners may wait a reasonable time after the conclusion of a storm to perform ice and snow removal from outside walkways and steps. Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 197-198 (1989). A property owner’s duty to perform reasonable snow and ice removal of outside walkways does not arise until after a reasonable period of time has passed after a storm ends. Umsteadt v. G.R. Realty, 123 Conn. App. 73, 83 (2010). The ongoing storm doctrine does not apply, however, if the defective condition arises from preexisting ice or snow, and not from the ongoing storm. Whether the alleged defective condition was caused by preexisting ice or snow and whether a storm has concluded are both questions of fact that may be decided by a jury. Kraus at 197-198.
Reprinted courtesy of
Angeline Ioannou, Lewis Brisbois,
Kenneth Walton, Lewis Brisbois,
Colin Hackett, Lewis Brisbois,
Gregory Katz, Lewis Brisbois and
Lauren Motola-Davis, Lewis Brisbois
Ms. Ioannou may be contacted at Angeline.Ioannou@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Walton may be contacted at Ken.Walton@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Hackett may be contacted at Colin.Hackett@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Katz may be contacted at Greg.Katz@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Motola-Davis may be contacted at Lauren.MotolaDavis@lewisbrisbois.com
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CDC Issues Moratorium on Residential Evictions Through 2020
October 05, 2020 —
Steven E. Ostrow, C. Jason Kim, & Marissa Levy - White and Williams LLPOn September 1, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced that it was issuing an order (CDC Order) to temporarily halt residential evictions to prevent the further spread of COVID-19. The CDC Order became effective on September 4, 2020 and will remain in effect through December 31, 2020.
The purpose of the CDC Order is to keep tenants in their residences to reduce crowding in shelters or other shared housing and to reduce the number of unsheltered homeless, as those conditions have been shown to increase the spread of COVID-19.
APPLICABILITY & PROTECTIONS
The CDC Order is broader than the previous eviction moratorium under the Coronavirus Relief and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), which applied only to federally-funded housing and expired on July 24, 2020. Eligible renters include those who qualified for a stimulus check under the CARES Act and individuals who expect to make less than $99,000 this year or a joint-filing couple that expects to make less than $198,000.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven E. Ostrow, White and Williams LLP,
C. Jason Kim, White and Williams LLP, and
Marissa Levy, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Ostrow may be contacted at ostrows@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Kim may be contacted at kimcj@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Levy may be contacted at levymp@whiteandwilliams.com
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Eleventh Circuit Vacates District Court Decision Finding No Duty to Defend Faulty Workmanship Claims
November 02, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the insurer finding there was no duty to defend. Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. Mac Contractors of Florida, LLC, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23918 (11th Cir. July 29, 2020).
Mac Contractors entered into a contract with homeowners to serve as general contractor for the construction of a custom residence. Problems arose during construction and Mac eventually led the job site before completing the project. The home owners sued, alleging that Mac and its subcontractors had left the residence "replete with construction defects." Damages were sought for having to repair and remediate all defective work performed by Mac.
Mac tendered under its CGL policy to its insurer, Southern-Owners. A defense was granted, but later withdrawn when Southern-Owners filed suit seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Mac. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found in favor of Southern-Owners based on the exclusion for "Damage to Your Work." The Eleventh Circuit vacated on appeal, concluding that the underlying complaint could fairly be construed to allege damages that fell outside of the exclusion.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
